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Abstract 
This study investigated relations between mother and child (N = 49) mental-state talk during 
shared pretense and children’s social symbolic play at age 3. Social symbolic play was not 
related to mothers’ mental-state talk. In contrast, children’s own use of desire-state talk in 
shared pretense was a better predictor of social symbolic play than their general use of 
mental-state talk, even after accounting for general verbal ability as well as mothers’ use of 
desires terms. Conclusion: These results highlight for the first time a link between children’s 
references to desires and their performance on social symbolic play at age 3 years – a social 
cognitive ability thought to precede theory of mind. 
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Child and mother mental-state talk in shared pretense as predictors of children’s social 
symbolic play abilities at age 3  
 
The ability to engage in pretense is a major developmental milestone of the second 
year of life, and is conceived as an important step towards a mature understanding of the mind 
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982; Leslie, 1987; Rakoczy, 2008). Because children’s symbolic 
play involves the conscious and simultaneous representation of reality and its fantasy 
alternatives (Lillard, 1993) – for instance, a blue napkin can also be a swimming pool or a 
blanket for a doll – it requires dual representation (real world and fantasy), thus promoting 
children’s metarepresentational abilities and laying the foundations for acquiring a 
representational theory of mind (Leslie, 1987; Lillard, 2001; Rakokzy, 2008).   
Children’s solitary symbolic play indexes their symbolic representational abilities, but 
social symbolic play – that shared with a partner – is also a measure of children’s tendency to 
take on other people’s perspectives. Social symbolic play is thus considered more 
sophisticated than solitary symbolic play (Dunn & Dale, 1984; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) as 
it involves two distinct levels of social cognition (Bretherton, 1989; Lillard, 1998). The first 
level occurs before the symbolic activity takes place, and consists of the negotiation and 
assignment of roles and behaviors between play partners. The second level takes place during 
pretense, and involves children simultaneously considering different symbolic perspectives. 
For example, the child may alter the content of their symbolic play in response to a suggestion 
or symbolic act from the other person. In this social context, symbolic play provides children 
with opportunities to contrast their own perspectives with those of others in co-constructing a 
representational context (Leslie, 1987; Meins & Russell, 1997; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). 
Empirical support for this claim comes from studies showing positive associations between 
children’s social symbolic play (with peers or adults) and their performance on false belief 
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tasks (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998; Nielsen 
& Dissanayake, 2000; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Astington and Jenkins (1995) highlighted 
the specificity of the association between theory of mind and children’s social symbolic play. 
It was only symbolic proposals and role assignments that were jointly agreed, as opposed to 
the overall amount of symbolic play, that were related to their theory of mind performance. 
Considering the unquestionable importance of social experience to the development of 
the understanding of the mind (for a review, see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004), references to 
mental states with a social partner may be strongly associated with the development of social 
symbolic play. Such an influence may operate in two distinct ways: through mothers’ and/or 
children’s mental-state talk. From a Vygotskian (1978) perspective, mothers’ use of mind-
related terms may be pivotal to the development of children’s social understanding. As they 
label their own and their children’s mental-states, mothers may contribute to the child’s 
internalization of the notion of self and others as distinct mental agents (Fernyhough, 2008; 
Symons, 2004), which may in turn aid to their ability to represent distinct perspectives. 
Recent studies provided support for this hypothesis by reporting concurrent and longitudinal 
associations between maternal mental-state talk and children’s theory of mind performance 
(e.g., Meins et al., 2002; Symons, Fossum, & Collins, 2006). Despite these findings, it 
remains unclear whether similar associations will emerge between maternal mental-state talk 
and an earlier milestone of social cognition – social symbolic play. As a result, our first goal 
was to test whether the use of mental-state talk by the mother would be concurrently 
associated with children’s ability to take on the symbolic perspective of an experimenter. We 
expected that mothers’ use of mental-state terms would be positively related to children’s 
social symbolic play. 
Children’s own mental-state talk can also be hypothesized to play an important role in 
the development of social symbolic play. In his theoretical account, Leslie (1987) posits an 
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isomorphism between pretend play and the use of mental-state terms, as both depend on the 
ability to form mental representations. Youngblade and Dunn (1995) take it a step further by 
suggesting that children’s mental-state talk (regarding one’s own as well as others’ mental-
states) provides them with the necessary representations that facilitate social symbolic play. 
Indeed, empirical studies have shown children’s mental-state talk to be related to later theory 
of mind abilities (e.g., Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991; Symons, 
Peterson, Slaughter, Roche, & Doyle, 2005). These findings, together with the observed links 
between social symbolic play and theory of mind (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Meins et al., 
1998; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995), suggest that children’s 
mental-state talk may be positively related to their social symbolic play. 
To date, only two studies have attempted to address this issue. Hughes and Dunn 
(1997) reported a positive association between preschoolers’ use of mental-state talk and their 
symbolic play with a peer. In the second study, Nielsen and Dissanayake (2000) found that 
preschoolers’ use of mental-state terms during free play with their parents was concurrently 
associated with the emergence of symbolic play within that context. However, these studies 
assessed both variables in a single play session with the same interlocutor, making it difficult 
to disentangle the child’s actual level of social symbolic play. Additionally, Nielsen and 
Dissanayake did not control for the children’s verbal ability or the parents’ own use of 
mental-state terms. By assessing social symbolic play with an experimenter, we aimed to 
provide a clearer picture of the children’s current social symbolic play abilities. 
However, it can also be argued that not all types of mental-state talk are relevant to the 
development of social symbolic play at age 3. In fact, it is around this age that children begin 
to understand how desires affect the way we feel and behave, in contrast with the 
understanding of beliefs which emerges later in the preschool years (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Recognizing other people’s wants and preferences may be an important first step for children 
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to integrate the symbolic perspectives of a social partner. Therefore, we may posit a more 
important role of children’s talk about desires, rather than their overall use of mental-state 
talk, as a training ground for social cognition at age 3.  
Finally, given that symbolic play is known to be positively associated with children’s 
verbal ability (Bates, Benigni, Bretherton, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1979; McCune-Nicolich, 
1981), and that mothers’ and children’s mental-state talk covary (Symons et al., 2006), the 
conclusions on the precise nature of the relation between children’s mental-state talk and their 
social symbolic play remain tentative. Our study aimed to clarify previous findings by 
assessing pretend play and mental-state talk in separate tasks, considering the role of both 
children’s and caregivers’ mental-state language, and taking children’s verbal ability into 
account as an important control variable. 
In summary, this study had two major goals: to investigate whether (a) mothers’ 
mental-state talk predicted children’s concurrent social symbolic play; and (b) children’s 
mental-state talk – either general use of mental-state talk or the specific use of desire terms - 
were predictors of more sophisticated social symbolic play, even after controlling for 
children’s verbal ability and mothers’ own use of desire references. Additionally, a secondary 
goal was to explore the relations between mothers’ and children’s use of mental state 
language.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 49 families recruited from child-care centers from a large city in the 
north of Portugal. Children (28 boys, 57.1%) were assessed at 3 years (M = 37.78 months, SD 
= .99, 36 – 40). Twenty-four children (49%) were singletons or had younger siblings and the 
remainder had one or two older siblings. Concerning maternal education, the majority 
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(67.3%; n = 33) had higher education qualifications, while 32.7% (n = 16) had completed 
between 5 and 12 years of formal education. All participants were White and had Portuguese 
as their first language. 
Procedure 
Each mother–child dyad attended a session at the University’s developmental 
laboratory, which lasted approximately 1½ hours, including a 15-minute break. During this 
visit, a predefined sequence of mother–child and experimenter–child interactions was video 
recorded. Within two weeks of the first visit, the children returned for a second session during 
which their general cognitive development was assessed. 
Measures 
Children’s social symbolic play. 
The structured play task was based on procedures used by Lewis and Boucher (1988) 
and Meins and Russell (1997). This task called upon the child’s ability to incorporate the 
suggestions of an unfamiliar adult into their own symbolic actions. As a result, it was 
intended to mirror the extent to which the child was capable of attending to and understanding 
other people’s perspectives in a play context. For this purpose, each child was presented with 
two sets of objects – two representational toys (doll and toy car) and nine objects with no 
obvious representational features, such as a toilet roll inner tube or a piece of aluminum foil. 
A 5-minute introductory play session, starting as soon as the child had made the first 
intentional contact with the objects, served the purpose of familiarizing the child with the 
materials. The introductory session was immediately followed by the structured play session, 
which involved two conditions – elicited and instructed play. At that moment, only two 
objects were left on the table (usually according to the child’s preferences): one 
representational toy and one “junk object”. In the elicited condition, no specific instructions 
were given to the child. The experimenter simply asked “What can you do with these?”. After 
Running Head: MENTAL-STATE TALK AND SOCIAL SYMBOLIC PLAY 	  
	  
8	  
	  
the child had carried out some action or given a verbal response (or in the clear absence of 
either), the experimenter asked the child to perform a specific action (e.g., doll and water 
bottle lid – “Make the doll eat the dinner off her plate”) – this was the instructed condition. 
The child was then presented with each of the remaining pairs of objects in randomized order. 
The coding for this task was based on Meins and Russell’s (1997) adaptation of the 
criteria outlined by Belsky, Garduque, and Hrncir (1984). Symbolic actions in the elicited and 
instructed conditions were rated on a 5-point Likert scale (from 0 to 4), with higher scores 
corresponding to greater symbolic sophistication. In the example presented above, the child 
could receive a score of 0 if he/she only played with the doll or the lid, separately; a score of 2 
if he/she prepared the meal for the doll (using the lid) but did not actually feed the doll; and a 
maximum score of 4 if he/she fed the doll from the lid, with both objects held in an upright 
position.  In addition to receiving a score for the elicited and instructed conditions, the 
potential number of stages through which the child could advance to reach the maximum 
score in each elicited condition was also recorded. For instance, if a child had received a score 
of 2 in the elicited condition, the number of stages the child could advance would be 2 (4-2). 
These scores allowed for the calculation of a summary score which reflected the child’s 
ability to understand and subsequently integrate the experimenter’s symbolic suggestions 
(Meins & Russell, 1997). In this study, we used this summary score as an indicator of 
children’s social symbolic play abilities. The score was expressed by the following equation:   
 
 
 
 
The higher the summary score, the more the child was able to benefit from the 
experimenter’s play suggestions by integrating them into his/her symbolic play. This ratio 
Average score instructed play – Average score elicited play 
Average number of levels remaining above elicited play levels 
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was intended to prevent floor effects, as it controlled for the number of levels above the 
child’s elicited play performance. However, ceiling effects were also possible. In order to 
control for this possibility, we replicated the precaution measure taken by Belsky et al. (1984) 
and correlated the overall score with the score resulting from the absolute difference between 
instructed play and elicited play. The high positive correlation coefficient, r = .98, p = .000, 
ensured us that neither ceiling nor floor effects affected the summary scores for this sample. 
All play sessions were coded by an experimenter who, at time of coding, was blind to 
all other measures, and a second blind rater additionally scored approximately 30% of the 
tapes. Inter-rater agreement (Intraclass Correlation Coefficient, two-way mixed) was 
considered to be excellent (Mean ri = .93; min = .92; max = .96). 
 
Mental-state talk. 
Mothers and children were invited to pretend to spend an afternoon at the beach – a 
common leisure activity for Portuguese families. A set of toys and props (e.g., toy food and 
drinks, empty sunscreen bottle, beach towels) were strategically placed along the floor of the 
room, and mothers were given a script with general guidelines. The task had no time limit, 
ending with a signal from the mother. This semi-structured shared pretense task was designed 
to elicit mental-state talk from both mothers and children. All the interactions were 
videotaped and transcribed for subsequent coding.  
Following previous studies (Brown & Dunn, 1992; Jenkins, Turrell, Kogushi, Lollis, 
& Ross, 2003) both children’s and mothers’ references to mental-states were coded into one 
of the following mutually exclusive categories: a) Desires and interests: e.g., like/dislike; 
love/hate; want; prefer (e.g., “Where would you like to go next?”; “This is my favorite 
color!”); b) Feelings: e.g., bored; amused; excited; happy (e.g., We’re having so much fun!”; 
“Are you bored?”); and c) Cognitions: e.g., think; decide; know; recognize; remember; 
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realize; expect; understand/solve (e.g., “Remember the last time we went to the beach?”; “Do 
you know what this is?”).  
Each participant received two scores for mental-state talk: mental words in proportion 
to the total number of words uttered in the shared pretense interaction; desire references in 
proportion to the total number of mental-state words. It could be argued that desire references 
should be a proportion of the total number of words in the interaction. However, due to the 
high number of words in the sessions (M = 1217.02, SD = 403.62 for mothers; M = 295.67, 
SD = 167.78 for children), these proportions were extremely low. Nevertheless, analyses 
using this alternative index produced the same pattern of results as the ones reported here.  
All pretend play sessions were coded by the first author. A random set of 30% of the tapes 
was coded by a second trained researcher blind to all other measures. Inter-rater agreement 
was excellent (κ = .95 and κ = .95 for mothers’ and children’s use of mental-state terms, 
respectively). 
Cognitive development. 
In the course of their second visit to the lab (which took place within a maximum of 
two weeks following the first visit), children’s cognitive development was assessed using the 
Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence – Revised (WPPSI-R; Wechsler, 2003). 
This scale yields three scores (Performance IQ, Verbal IQ, and Full Scale IQ), and has been 
shown to have excellent reliability (.93 for the Performance subscale; .94 for the Verbal 
subscale and .97 for the Full Scale). The Performance and Verbal IQ scores were used in the 
analyses.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analyses  
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With respect to social symbolic play, two of the nine toy–object pairs were excluded 
from the summary score because the majority of children obtained the maximum score in both 
elicited and instructed conditions. The social symbolic play summary scores are shown in 
Table 1. 
In the mother–child shared pretense task, only 4 children (8.2%) did not use any 
mental-state terms (desires, feelings, or cognitions). Forty-five children (91.8%) made one or 
more references to desires. In what concerns maternal mental-state talk, all 49 mothers used 
one or more mental-state term regardless of type, whereas 47 mothers (95.9%) made at least 
one reference to desires.  
 
=== Table 1 about here === 
 
Relations between children’s social symbolic play and control variables. 
Table 2 shows the correlations between children’s social symbolic play scores and 
children’s sex, presence of older siblings, verbal IQ, performance IQ, and maternal education. 
All associations were non-significant apart from the positive correlation between social 
symbolic play and verbal IQ. 
 
=== Table 2 about here === 
 
Relations between children’s and mothers’ mental-state talk. 
 Mothers’ and children’s use of mind-related terms were positively associated using 
Pearson’s r correlations. Mothers who made more references to mental-states were more 
likely to have children who employed mental-state terms in their speech (r = .28, p = .048). In 
addition, more maternal references to desires were associated with more child references to 
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desires (r = .36, p = .010). In contrast, children’s general use of mental-state talk was 
unrelated with mothers’ desire comments (r = .25, p = .088), and children’s specific desire 
comments were also unrelated to mothers’ general mental-state references (r = -.14, p = .330). 
 
Regression Analyses 
We performed two hierarchical regression analyses (Models A an B) in order to 
examine which variables were significant predictors of children’s ability to incorporate the 
experimenter’s symbolic play suggestions.  
In Model A we investigated whether general mental-state references – by the mothers 
as well as the children - predicted children’s social symbolic play. As children’s verbal IQ 
significantly correlated with their social symbolic play, it was thus included in the regression 
model (step 1). Mothers’ and children’s percentages of references to mental-states were 
entered at step 2 (Table 3).  
 
=== Table 3 about here === 
 
The regression model was significant at step 1, F (1,48) = 7.47, p = .009, explaining 
14% of variance. In addition, Model A was significant at step 2, F (3,48) = 5.03, p = .004, 
explaining 25% of variance. Mothers’ mental-state talk was not a significant predictor of 
children’s social symbolic play. In contrast, children’s overall mental-state talk predicted their 
social symbolic play: children who made more mental references in shared pretense with their 
mothers tended to perform better on the social symbolic play task with an experimenter.  
In Model B we sought to determine whether children’s specific references to desires 
(rather than general references to mental states) were a stronger predictor of their social 
symbolic play. Once again, children’s verbal IQ scores were entered at step 1. Maternal 
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references to desires were also entered at this initial step as a control variable, as they were 
shown to correlate with children’s desire references. This ensured us that any significant 
results would not be better explained by the influence of mothers’ desire references on 
children’s talk. Finally, children’s proportion of desire talk was entered at step 2. 
The regression model was significant at step 1, F (2,48) = 4.21, p = .021, explaining 
16% of variance. As shown in Table 3, maternal references to desires did not predict 
children’s performance on social symbolic play, only their verbal IQ scores did. Furthermore, 
the regression model was significant at step 2, F (3,48) = 5.59, p = .002, explaining 27% of 
variance. Children’s references to desires in shared pretense with the mother made a 
significant and unique contribution to the prediction of their ability to integrate the 
experimenter’s play suggestions: more references to desires with the mother were associated 
with better social symbolic play with the experimenter. This association was independent of 
the children’s verbal IQ as well as mothers’ own desire comments in the pretense interaction.  
 
Discussion 
Our first prediction regarded the possible influence of maternal mental-state talk on 
children’s concurrent social symbolic play abilities at age 3. Contrary to our expectations, no 
measure of maternal mental-state talk, either general (total proportion of mental terms) or 
specific (references to desires), predicted children’s concurrent willingness and ability to 
incorporate the experimenter’s play suggestions into their symbolic play. These results can be 
interpreted in various ways. Firstly, we can conjecture that maternal mental-state talk may 
have exerted its role in the development of children’s social symbolic play at an earlier stage, 
and that concurrent mental-state talk may in turn influence later milestones of social 
cognition. Another possible explanation for the apparent lack of associations may have 
stemmed from the level of elaboration that mothers invested in their mental-state talk. 
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Previous studies on the impact of maternal talk about feelings have shown that causal and 
elaborate explanations accompanying such mental terms, rather than their simple use, were 
linked to better emotion understanding (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994; Garner, Jones, 
Gaddy, & Rennie, 1997). We cannot rule out a similar effect in our sample, as we did not 
assess the level of elaboration of maternal mental-state terms.  
This leads us to the argument that accuracy of mind-related comments might have also 
played an important role. In their study on maternal mind-mindedness, Meins et al. (2003) 
found that mothers’ use of mind-related terms that appropriately commented on their infants’ 
mental-states at age 6 months independently predicted theory of mind in the preschool years. 
Although this approach could have been conducted in our study, we opted not to do so. 
Making appropriate comments regarding an infant’s supposed mental-states at 6 months 
involves a great deal of interpretation from the mother. On the contrary, at age 3, children are 
generally verbally fluent and increasingly able to communicate their mental-states (Bretherton 
& Beeghly, 1982). Therefore, we believe it is necessary to develop a measure of 
appropriateness that is not based solely on children’s affirmative responses to maternal 
suggestions and comments, as it would likely reflect other factors such as children’s 
temperament or maternal sensitivity. It is also conceivable that mothers’ proclivity to use 
mental-state terms is not a stable trait, but rather a dimension of maternal verbal behavior that 
can be influenced by individual, relational, and contextual aspects of mothers’ own lives. 
Accordingly, studies have found aspects such as maternal psychopathology (e.g., Murray, 
Kempton, Woolgar, & Hooper, 1993; Pawlby et al., 2010; Wan et al., 2007) or perceived 
marital conflict (e.g., Pancsofar, Vernon-Feagans, Odom, & Roe, 2008; Pratt, Kerig, Cowan, 
& Cowan, 1992) to interfere with mothers’ verbalizations towards their children. Finally, it 
must be noted that incorporating an experimenter's suggestions into pretend play may draw 
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upon different mentalizing abilities than those involved in classic theory of mind tasks. Future 
studies may address how closely social symbolic play and theory of mind are related. 
Another set of results that also deserves discussion concerns the associations between 
mothers’ and children’s references to mental-states. When mothers used more mental-state 
talk, their children were also more likely to use mental terms in general. In addition, we found 
a link between mothers’ and children’s references to desires – the more desire words used by 
the mother, the more the child tended to employ desire references. Such results are consistent 
with previous data (Symons et al., 2006). It may also be argued that by using mental-state 
language that the child can readily understand, the mother is providing the “appropriate 
framework for mental activity within a conversation” (Symons et al., 2006, p. 687).  
Regarding our second prediction, we found support for the hypothesis that children’s 
talk about desires (rather than their overall use of mind-related terms) plays a more important 
role in their social symbolic play abilities. In our study, we found that children’s use of desire 
terms was a better predictor of their social symbolic play abilities than children’s total 
proportion of mental-states. Indeed, the model that included children’s desire references 
explained almost a third of variance (in contrast with the model including general mental 
references, which explained only a quarter). This result, coupled with the fact that desire 
terms were the most common mental-state references made by the children in our sample, 
suggests that children’s desires references were the best predictor of their social symbolic 
play abilities, above and beyond the influences of verbal ability, as well as mother’s own 
desire references. These results bring further weight to the developmental progression in 
children’s understanding of mind proposed by Perner (1991) and Wellman and colleagues 
(Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Before children have acquired a representational 
theory of mind, they are ‘situation theorists’ (Perner, 1991) who understand how events in the 
world can lead to desires and emotions. According to Wellman (1990), understanding desires 
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provides young children with a crucial into comprehending more complex internal states such 
as beliefs, and how internal states guide people’s behavior. As children in our sample were 
still too young to possess a mature knowledge about beliefs, their explanations of human 
behavior rely mostly on their attributions of desires. In fact, empirical studies have confirmed 
that children develop their understanding of desires before they understand beliefs and that 
the former assist them in the development of a mature theory of mind (Wellman & Liu, 2004). 
Our study therefore expands on such accounts, by showing a similar pattern of results 
between children’s desire talk and their concurrent performance on social symbolic play – a 
milestone of social cognition in the early preschool years.  
Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that the cross-sectional nature of our data does 
not allow us to make strong inferences of causality. However, research confirms that this may 
be an appropriate interpretation. Similar to our study, others have provided links between 
children’s mental-state talk and both concurrent and longitudinal social cognitive outcomes 
(e.g., Dunn et al., 1991; Hughes & Dunn, 1997; Nielsen & Dissanayake, 2000; Symons et al., 
2005). Specifically, a study by Hughes and Dunn (1998), focusing on the impact of discourse 
among preschool aged children and their peers, found that mental-state talk at 3 years of age 
predicted theory of mind a year later, but the opposite causal relation did not hold. These 
results support the notion of a true causal link between children’s mental-state talk and their 
social cognitive development. Talk about desires may therefore have promoted the 
understanding of subjective stances, an ability required for social symbolic play. This 
particular set of results highlights the need to consider different types of mental-state talk, and 
not just mind-related references in general, when investigating the role of children’s talk 
about the mind on development.  
The findings reported expand previous research by focusing on a less well-studied 
milestone of social cognition – social symbolic play. We have explored the associations (or 
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the lack thereof) between mothers’ and children’s mental-state talk, and children’s social 
symbolic play abilities. Our results highlight, for the first time, a link between early preschool 
children’s references to desires in shared pretense with the mother and their social cognitive 
competence in a social symbolic play task with an adult experimenter. This result has 
particular implications for subsequent research as it suggests the need to consider the role of 
different types of mental-state talk, namely children’s references to desires, when studying the 
development of social cognition in young preschoolers. 
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Table 1  
Mean (SD) and Range Scores for all Variables  
 Mean (SD) Range 
Social symbolic play .05 (.04) -.07 - .11 
Children’s mental-state talk (raw/percentage)   
Total 8.02 (7.47) 0 – 35 
Desires  7.00 (6.93)/ 80.12 (30.62) 0 – 35/ 0 – 100 
Mother’s mental-state talk (raw/percentage)   
Total 27.59 (16.63) 4 – 81 
Desires 18.41 (12.85)/ 65.77 (21.96) 0 – 55/ 0 – 100 
Cognitive Development    
Verbal IQ 111.24 (16.55) 71 – 153 
Performance IQ 110.65 (13.17) 85 – 143 
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Table 2  
Correlations Between Children’s Social Symbolic Play and Control Variables at 3 Years 
 Social symbolic play 
Sex (M/F)a -.02 
Older siblings (N/Y)a -.17 
Verbal IQb .37** 
Performance IQb .16 
Maternal education (without/with college education)a .02 
** p < .01 
arpb; br 
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Table 3 
Regression Models for Children’s Social Symbolic Play 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
 
 Steps and variables R2 (Adjusted R2) β F change 
Model A      
 Step 1 (df 1,48) .14 (.12)  7.47** 
 Verbal IQ    .37**  
 Step 2 (df 3,48) .25 (.20)  5.03** 
 Verbal IQ    .40**  
 Total maternal mental-state talk   -.26  
 Total child mental-state talk   .31*  
Model B      
 Step 1 (df 2,48) .16 (.12)  4.21* 
 Verbal IQ   .40**  
 Maternal desire references   .14  
 Step 2 (df 3,48) .27 (.22)  5.59*** 
 Verbal IQ   .41**  
 Maternal desire references   .004  
 Child desire references   .37**  
